西方对中国的习惯性评估之一是，中国将不中断地崛起，最终成为全球霸主。中国很快将超越美国，成为全球最大的经济体。快进几十年，中国将担任起超级大国的重任。在此过程中的某个阶段，其政治体制将过渡到带有一些民主色彩。

但这是一个具有欺骗性的简单论点，对参与中国淘金浪潮的西方企业高管尤其有吸引力。然而，每次访问北京，我都留意到，中国领导人在国际舞台上的声音越尖锐，他们在国内就看似越不安全。

中国无疑正在让全世界感受到自己的存在。邓小平的“韬光养晦”战略已经被毫不掩饰的强硬取代，这种态度让邻国和美国不安。东海以及南海的长期海上纠纷已成为军事引爆点。中国的博客上充斥着呼吁中国领导人好好教训一下宿敌的呼声。

北 京的政策制定者坚称，中国无意统治全球。他们说，帝国的观念违背所有的历史传统。统治精英还抗议道，他们发挥了约束网络空间狂热民族主义的作用。不过，官 员们表示，没错，“中央王国”已经发展到了这样一个阶段，即在攸关国家利益的问题上由自己说了算。同时，中国不打算聆听剥削、侵略中国逾一个世纪的西方列 强说教。

在一定程度上，中国新展现出的自信直接反映了商业关系。政治从属于经济：中国地缘政治利益的扩张是贸易和投资关系激增的结果。而 且，心态也有了明显的转变。尽管官员们依然讲着陈词滥调，称中国是发展中国家，不能肩负起国际治理的重担，但他们也拒绝这样的构想：让中国参与到华盛顿制 定的一整套规则中，成为一个利益相关者。

官员们在谈到即将上任的国家主席习近平时，强调的重点依然是持续性，而不是变化。去年中共十八大 制订了指导性原则。若有西方人对中国的战略方向表示好奇，他们会得到有关十八大程序的详尽（且令人疲倦）叙述。不过，有一点所有人都认同：习近平将比胡锦 涛更加强势。据悉，这位新的国家主席对权力的掌控更紧。

北京坚称，中国不希望在国外发生冲突，进而打断经济进步。逻辑表明，这话肯定是没 错的。但是，当中国与日本在东海；与越南、菲律宾及其他国家在南海的对话转为纠纷，人们很难忽视更强硬的言辞。发生军事冲突的风险——尤其是与日本在尖阁 诸岛(Senkaku islands，中国称为“钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿”)海域发生冲突的风险——远非可忽略不计。在此背后，还潜藏着中国海军与美国太平洋舰队发生冲突的危险。

习近平担心国内稳定是对的。中国经济面对的挑战清晰无比。全球经济放缓将很快遇上中国人口结构老龄化。中国劳动力人数已经见顶，中国人即将变老，而且速度会非常快。因此，新领导层承诺加快目前仍相当模糊的经济改革。

留 意民怨的习近平，承诺杜绝官僚主义铺张浪费，打击腐败。如今，中共官员非常小心，避免佩戴名贵手表。官方的计划是推动经济再平衡，使其转向在更大程度上由 内需拉动。迄今党的表现还不错。但下一步会更加艰难。腐败已经在经济体制中固化。如果放开热门部门，使其接受民间资本投资，就有可能与大国企老板发生冲 突。与此同时，中国最大的担心是落入中等收入陷阱。

在政治方面，很难找到任何实施重大改革的迹象。收入提升与社交媒体爆炸式增长，改写了中国社会和政治话语的条款。审查者很难跟上3亿多微博用户的步伐。谷歌(Google)虽被屏蔽，但似乎所有人都有办法登录Gmail。

对 于近期出现的民众抗议，无论是针对腐败、高压审查制度，还是北京的有毒污染，官方的回应都是精心调整，避免对抗。有迹象显示，党可能改革武断的“劳改”拘 留制度。但如果提议在国家与公民之间重新分配权力，官员们会立马板脸。即将卸任的总理温家宝所提倡的现代化计划，在他离任后不太可能有人继续推动。

然而，力量已经开始在国家与个人之间转移，而这一点没有得到认可。中共认为，应对社会与政治不安定，答案在于经济增长。但繁荣产生其自身的动力，它将带来要求政治变革的越来越大压力，而不是化解这种压力的妙方。

中 国并没有出现疾呼实施西方式民主的声音。党依然是国家的监护者。但随着中产阶层壮大，普通公民难免要求政府透明、接受问责。繁荣使法治与他们休戚相关，而 数字革命则为他们提供了推动自身诉求的手段。就目前而言，党不这么认为。结果，中国看起来一方面更加强大，另一方面更加脆弱。

译者/何黎

A habitual western estimation of China charts its uninterrupted ascent to global hegemony. It will soon overtake the US as the world’s largest economy. Fast forward a few decades and it will assume the mantle of the pre-eminent power. Some time in between, its political system will make the transition to something resembling democracy.

It is a beguilingly simple thesis, one particularly attractive to the western business executives who have joined the China gold rush. Yet what strikes me whenever I visit Beijing is that the more strident China’s leaders sound on the global stage, the more insecure they seem at home.

China is certainly making its presence felt internationally. The hide-your-strength strategy of Deng Xiaoping has made way for an unabashed assertiveness that unsettles neighbours and worries the US. Long-standing maritime disputes in the East and South China seas have become military flashpoints. The Chinese blogosphere overflows with calls for the country’s leaders to teach old enemies a lesson.

Policy makers in Beijing insist that China has no interest in global dominion. The idea of empire, they say, runs against all historic tradition. The ruling elite also protests that it acts as a restraint on the nationalist fervour in cyberspace. But, yes, officials say, the Middle Kingdom has reached a point when it expects to get its way on issues of national interest. And, no, it is not about to take lectures from western powers that exploited and invaded China over more than a century.

In part, the new assertiveness is a straightforward reflection of commercial ties. Politics follows economics: China’s expanding geopolitical interests are a consequence of multiplying trade and investment relationships. There has also been, however, a discernible change of mindset. Much as officials still say that, as a “developing” country, China cannot carry the burden of international governance, they are dismissive of the idea that it should sign up as a stakeholder in a set of rules made in Washington.

Talk among officials about Xi Jinping, the incoming president, emphasises continuity over change. The guiding principles were laid down at last year’s Communist party congress. Westerners curious about strategic direction are offered exhaustive (and exhausting) accounts of the proceedings. There is one thing, however, on which everyone seems to agree. Mr Xi will be stronger than Hu Jintao. The new president, it is said, has a tighter grip on the levers of power.

Beijing insists it does not want clashes abroad to disrupt economic progress. Logic says that must be right. Yet it is hard to miss the sharper edge to the rhetoric when conversation turns to disputes with Japan in the East China Sea and with Vietnam, the Philippines and others in the South China Sea. The risk of a military clash, particularly with Japan in the waters around the Senkaku (or, in Chinese, Diaoyu) islands is far from negligible. Alongside it lies the danger of a collision between the Chinese navy and the US Pacific fleet.

Mr Xi is right to worry about stability at home. China’s economic challenge is clear enough. A slowing global economy will soon collide with his country’s ageing demographic profile. The labour force has peaked; the country is about to grow older. Fast. So the new leadership has promised to accelerate as yet fairly vague economic reforms.

Mindful of popular discontent, Mr Xi has pledged to scrap bureaucratic pomp and excess and to crack down on corruption. Party officials are these days careful about wearing expensive watches. The plan is to press on with a rebalancing of the economy towards domestic demand. So far the party has not done a bad job. The next stage will be harder. Corruption is embedded in the fabric of the economy. Freeing up capital for investment in dynamic sectors risks confrontation with the bosses of big state-owned enterprises. All the while, China’s great fear is of falling into the middle-income trap.

Turn to politics and it is hard to find any hint of significant reform. Rising incomes and the explosion of social media have rewritten the terms of China’s social and political discourse. The censors struggle to keep up with the more than 300m users of the weibo microblogging sites. Google is blocked but everyone seems to have a way of accessing their Gmail.

The response to recent popular protests – whether about corruption, heavy handed censorship or lethal levels of pollution in Beijing – has been calibrated to avoid confrontation. There have been hints that the party could reform the arbitrary detention system known as “re-education through labour”. But suggest a redistribution of power between state and citizens and the response of officials is stony-faced, The modernisation programme promoted by Wen Jiabao, the outgoing prime minister, looks unlikely to survive his departure.

What’s missing is a recognition that the power shift between state and individual is already under way. The party thinks the answer to social and political unrest is economic growth. But prosperity generates its own dynamic – as the source of, rather than an antidote to, rising pressure for political change.

There is no great clamour in China for western democracy. The party remains the nation’s guardian. But the simple fact of joining the middle class leads ordinary citizens to demand transparent, accountable government. Prosperity gives them a vital stake in the rule of law; and the digital revolution provides a means to press their case. For now, the party thinks otherwise. The consequence is a China that looks at once stronger and more fragile.