| Oil firms have to go where the oil (and gas) is. Increasingly, that place is the U.S. |
|
石油（天然气）在哪儿，石油公司的脚步就跟到哪儿。美国正日益成为石油公司瞄准的目标。 |
| |
|
| Over half of global upstream oil and gas mergers and acquisitions since the start of 2011 targeted U.S. assets, up from an average of 37% in the prior four years, according to consultancy IHS Herold. Besides a relatively open market for energy assets, the shale boom has drawn in companies seeking reserves and know-how. |
咨询公司IHS Herold的数据显示，自2011年初以来，全球超过一半的石油和天然气上游并购交易瞄准的是美国油气资产，而之前的四年这一比例平均只有37%。除了相对开放的能源资产市场，页岩热潮也吸引了很多寻求油气储量和专有技术的公司。 |
| |
|
| But this shift in the center of gravity for oil M&A poses a quandary for one group of important buyers: China's national oil companies, or NOCs. |
但石油行业并购重心的转移使一个重要的买家群体陷入了两难，这就是中国的国有石油公司。 |
| |
|
| Their traditional strength--the backing of Beijing--doesn't work in the U.S. When Washington derailed CNOOC's $18.5 billion bid for Unocal in 2005, much was made of the potential for vital U.S. resources and technology being transferred to the Chinese government at a time when peak oil fears were taking hold. |
他们的传统优势“中国政府的支持”在美国无法发挥出来。当华盛顿2005年否决中海油(CNOOC)斥资185亿美元竞购加州联合石油公司(简称：Unocal)的方案时，在人们对石油产出由盛转衰的担忧占据上风之际，有关美国重要资源和技术可能被转移至中国政府的说法甚嚣尘上。 |
| |
|
| In theory, the shale boom should have eased concerns about scarce resources. But this wasn't the main issue with Unocal: Most of its reserves were in Asia. U.S. objections had more to do with CNOOC's hostile approach cutting across Chevron's own designs on the company, says Robin West, founder of consultancy PFC Energy. Unocal eventually accepted Chevron's embrace. |
从理论上讲，页岩的繁荣应该能够缓解对稀缺资源的担忧。但这并非中海油竞购Unocal失败的主要原因，因为Unocal大多数油气储量位于亚洲。咨询公司PFC Energy的创始人韦斯特(Robin West)说，美国之所以提出反对，更多的是因为中海油对雪佛龙(Chevron)提出的所有关于Unocal的设计方案持敌对态度。Unocal最终投向了雪佛龙的怀抱。 |
| |
|
| Yet China's NOCs can't ignore the U.S. Indeed, half their overseas acquisitions of upstream assets this year have been stateside, up from 7.6% last year, according to IHS. Their interests lie primarily in seeking expertise in developing shale resources that they can apply back home. |
但中国国有石油公司无法忽视美国。事实上，IHS的数据表示，今年以来中国国有石油公司在海外收购的上游油气资产有一半在美国境内，而去年这一比例只有7.6%。这些公司的兴趣主要在获取开发页岩资源的专业知识，因为他们可以在中国国内运用这些技术。 |
| |
|
| Luckily for the NOCs, this can mostly be achieved with forming joint ventures with U.S. exploration and production companies; CNOOC's deals with Chesapeake Energy in recent years are an example. |
幸运的是，对中国国有石油公司来说，和美国油气勘探和生产公司组建合资企业可以实现上述目的。近年来中海油与切萨皮克能源公司(Chesapeake Energy)的一系列交易就是一个很好的例子。 |
| |
|
| 'You acquire control when you think you can run the assets better' says Trevor Houser, a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Besides politics, the risk with buying a company is that employees leave, taking their expertise elsewhere. Even Exxon Mobil worried about this when it acquired XTO Energy in 2010, one reason it gave the business its own division. That risk would likely be even higher for a Chinese acquirer. |
彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的访问学者豪泽(Trevor Houser)说，当你认为你能更好地经营这些资产的时候，你希望获得控制权。除了政治因素以外，收购一家公司所伴随的风险还包括员工可能离职，把他们的专业技术带到其它公司。甚至就连埃克森美孚(Exxon Mobil)在2010年收购XTO Energy时也曾担心过这一问题。这也是埃克森美孚为XTO Energy专门成立一个部门的原因。如果收购方是一家中资企业，这一风险可能还要高。 |
| |
|
| For U.S. E&P companies and their investors, suffering from the collapse in gas prices, this situation is bittersweet. The buying power of Chinese NOCs and their desire to learn about shale resource development makes them important potential buyers for assets, such as those Chesapeake has for sale. |
对于遭受汽油价格大幅下跌的美国油气勘探和生产公司及其投资者而言，这一现状可谓是喜忧参半。中国国有石油公司的购买力以及他们对页岩资源开发技术的渴望使得他们成为多种资产的重要潜在买家，就像切萨皮克能源公司出售的那些资产。 |
| |
|
Full takeovers remain unlikely, though. The U.S. might not worry quite so much about energy security these days--but rivalry with China spans much more than that.
|
但中国国有石油公司全面收购美国油气资产的可能性不大，虽然如今美国对能源安全的担心程度可能有所降低，但美国同中国的竞争远远不止于此。
|
加好友 
发短信
Post By：2012/7/25 10:23:38
